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Interception of Communications and Legal Professional Privilege and the Rule 
of Law
Lisa Webley1
Legal professional privilege, sometimes referred to as legal privilege, sits at the intersection 
between professional conduct rules, more general precepts about duties of confidence we 
owe to others, and common law principles designed to protect the functioning of the legal 
system. Legal advice privilege only extends to communications between the lawyer and the 
client seeking that advice; litigation privilege is broader taking in communications between 
third parties too, as long as the principal purpose of those communications relates to the 
litigation contemplated or underway. The professional conduct rules indicate that solicitors and 
barristers must neither disclose their client’s privileged information to others, nor make use of 
privileged material that has been revealed to them in error.2  But the common law principles 
bind everyone including the state and have done for around 400 years. They play an important 
role in safeguarding the rule of law, in part by seeking to ensure that clients are not dissuaded 
from seeking legal advice and counsel, and further to permit them to be represented fully, 
frankly and robustly when litigation is in prospect and for there to be the prospect of a fair trial. 
They act as a (modest) protection against the covert investigatory powers of the state; some 
branches of the state may be lawfully empowered to spy on clients forms of communications 
but not those covered by privilege. Even lawyer-client interactions are sometimes exempt from 
privilege, for example where they are used as a means through which to commit crime.3 These 
common law principles were put on a statutory footing by the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (PACE) in the context of lawyer-client communications in custody4, and have been 
recognised in European Court of Human Rights judgments as well as those in British courts. 
Lawyer-client privileged communications have, until recently, been considered to be a 
constitutional no-go area for the security services in Britain. In sum, legal professional privilege 
is viewed as central to the lawyer-client relationship and to the system of justice.  
Or so as lawyers we have been taught.  But the enactment of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in Britain provided no overt protection for legal professional privilege 
when greater powers of state surveillance were granted to a range of public authorities; the 
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powers are granted through differing levels of executive rather than judicial authorisation.5 The 
issue was not debated in Parliament and it was unclear whether this was an oversight or a 
deliberate omission.6 The matter was left to Codes of Practice7 that explain when appropriate 
and how public authorities may be permitted to use powers of covert surveillance; the Codes 
also provide guidance on what procedures must be followed in the event that the powers are 
to be deployed.  But these were felt to afford inadequate protections by the legal professional 
bodies. Given the seriousness of the situation the Bar Council attempted to rectify the defects 
of RIPA as regards legal professional privilege by advocating for a new clause to be introduced 
into the Protection of Freedoms Bill prior to its enactment in 2012, but it was unsuccessful.8 
RIPA provides for oversight of the use of covert surveillance powers by the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal9, which may determine complaints where a claimant asserts that a public 
authority’s use of covert techniques is unlawful on grounds of breach of European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) article 8 privacy rights and other fundamental human rights.  
However, the Tribunal is not a fully constituted court with plenary powers and, further, as the 
Human Rights Act 1998 does not give even plenary courts the power to set aside primary 
legislation on grounds of its incompatibility with the ECHR, the Tribunal’s judgments act more 
as a means to point a moral compass than a mechanism through which to enforce rights.  
Those who may have thought that the omission of specific protection for legal privilege was 
likely a mistake, and in any event would not allow for the clearly enumerated common law 
principles to be overborn and/or would still be respected by the state, have since been 
disabused. A number of revelations have made this clear, including the use of undercover 
policing in circumstances where covert officers have had explicit access to legally privileged 
material, in at least one instance by attending a lawyer-client meeting when neither the lawyer 
nor the client-defendant was on notice that the person concerned was a police officer.10 
Convictions in at least 20 other criminal cases have been overturned following fresh scrutiny 
about undercover policing methods that rendered those convictions unsafe.11 The House of 
Lords’ majority decision In Re McE12 reluctantly laid to rest the contention that the legal 
privilege was transcendent in English Law (always unlikely given that it lived in the common 
law, subordinate to statute), and further that the lack of express words in RIPA to override the 
protections in PACE afforded to clients in custody could be used as a means to distinguish 
such communications from RIPA’s scope (although the dissenting opinion of Lord Matravers 
indicates that he considered that PACE prevailed for that very reason)13 And material that 
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came to light in the Belhadj case before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal led the Tribunal to 
make a declaration “that since January 2010 the  regime for the interception/obtaining, 
analysis, use,  disclosure and destruction of legally privileged material has contravened Article 
8 ECHR and was  accordingly unlawful.”14 The security service and GCHQ confirmed that they 
would review their policies and procedures in the light of the draft Interception Code of Practice 
and following the Tribunal’s ruling.
Given the concerns voiced about the lack of protection afforded to legal privilege, and the 
mounting evidence that supported those concerns, it is perhaps surprising that the recently 
published draft Investigatory Powers Bill has not sought to address them other than via a 
Code. Greater judicial oversight is included, but breaches of the Code will not at present give 
rise to civil or criminal penalties. The Bar Council, in its evidence to the all-party joint committee 
scrutinising the draft Bill legislation, considered that the Bill may undermine legal privilege 
even further if enacted in its current form.15 In February the Joint Committee gave the Bill its 
cautious support but did point to the need to strengthen protections within the Bill including 
protection of privilege.16 The government’s response gives little hope that they plan to address 
this issue17, and the Bill is now making its way through Parliament on a very tight timetable. A 
public campaign has begun to seek to persuade law-makers in both Houses to think again 
about the lack of legal professional privilege and whistle-blower safeguards within the 
Investigatory Powers Bill. The Speak in Safety campaign has been championed by the Bar 
Council, with support from the National Union of Journalists and the Law Society of England 
and Wales.18 It believes that the Bill as written undermines the professions that have key roles 
in ensuing democracy and freedom and further that the provisions undermine the rule of law; 
it recognises that there is a public interest need for covert surveillance but that suitably 
rigorous statutory limits must be placed on state powers in the public interest too.19 The 
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proposed Code gives little confidence that the safeguards will be sufficient, and no guarantee 
that they will not be watered down over time.  
It is clear from the written evidence to the Joint Committee that there are many legal 
professionals who are extremely concerned about the state’s apparent appetite to encroach 
on legal professional privilege.  The sheer number of Bar Council press statements on the 
issue is further testament to that.20 In view of the information that has been made public 
subsequent to RIPA’s introduction they have good reason to be worried. But there are less 
obvious situations in which legal professionals may struggle with these provisions. For 
example, prosecution counsel may be handed legally privilege material gained through covert 
surveillance measures which may have been obtained potentially lawfully in English law, 
would place them under a professional duty to consider whether they could continue to act for 
the client. They would have to demur publicly from disclosing their reasons for ceasing to act, 
as the professional duty of confidentiality trumps the duty to disclose in most instances.  Were 
they to reveal their reasons for returning instructions beyond the client’s circle they may face 
prosecution themselves under the Official Secrets Act 1989 or other legislation that prevents 
lawyers from tipping someone off that they are under investigation. But they may feel very 
conflicted knowing that the fairness of litigation may be about to be compromised as a result 
of intercepted privileged communications with few, if any, avenues to allow them to raise their 
concerns. It is a murky area, fraught with ethical difficulty, but one that is fundamental to the 
rule of law. 
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